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The world is about to experience a demographic 
revolution. Throughout history, the elderly popu-
lation (people aged 65 and over) never amount-
ed to more than 2−3% in any country. Today, in 
developed countries, the elderly population ac-
counts for 15% of the total population. The Unit-
ed Nations projected that by 2030 the elderly 
population will increase to 25% and nearly 30% 
by 2050. Soon, the elderly population will out-
number children under age 5 for the fi rst time in 
human history.  
Until recently, Korea had the youngest popula-
tion among OECD nations. But a young Korea 
is about to grow old at a stunning rate. A county 
is considered an “aging society” when the num-
ber of people aged 65 or older reaches 7.0% of 
its total population. It becomes an “aged soci-
ety” when the elderly population reaches 14% or 
more and a “super-aged society” when they ac-
count for 20%. Korea became an “aging society” 
in 2000. In 2018, Korea will become an “aged 
society” when 14.4% of its population will be 
comprised of the elderly, and a “super-aged soci-
ety” by 2026. By 2050, Korea is expected to be-
come one of the most aged nations in the world, 
with the elderly population reaching 38% of the 
total population.   
The nation cannot avoid becoming an aged soci-
ety. But Korea’s problem is the speed with which 
it is approaching. It will take Korea 19 years to 
move from an “aging” to “aged” society, much 
faster than that of other developed countries. Ko-
rea is becoming the most rapidly aging society in 
the world.
Underlying this speedy transition are its dramatic 
decline in birth rate and signifi cant improvement 
in life expectancy. The rapid changes in demog-
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2raphy will bring about new and different challeng-
es on the economic, social, and political fronts. Is 
Korea ready for the future? 
Reasons for Rapid Demographic Changes: The 
most signifi cant reason for Korea’s rapidly aging 
population is the low fertility rate. Korea’s demo-
graphic transition stared in the beginning of the 
1960s. During the fi ve-year economic develop-
ment plan (1962−1967), the nation’s GDP grew at 
an annual rate of 7%, and it continued to expand 
rapidly. Believing that increasing population was 
undermining economic prosperity, the Korean gov-
ernment actively campaigned for a family planning 
program. In 1973, abortion became legal, and, by 
1983, the government suspended medical insur-
ance and maternal care for women with three or 
more children. In the late 1980s, public and private 
agencies were involved in promoting and encour-
aging married couples to have fewer children. As 
a result of “extremely effective” government-led 
policies, Korea’s population declined too rapidly. 
According to a 2008 United Nation’s report, Korea 
has the second lowest birthrate in the world. Within 
a generation, Korea’s birth rate declined far below 
the replacement rate of 2.1, which was reached in 
1983. 
Figure 1: Fertility Rate  (Birth per Woman of Child-
bearing Age, %)
Source: Korean National Statistical Offi ce 
An inadequate social structure for supporting 
childbearing and childrearing, which discourages 
women to have and raise children, also contributed 
to the decline to the fertility in Korea. With grow-
ing opportunities for higher education, careers, and 
economic independence, young Korean women 
are delaying motherhood. Moreover, for those who 
choose to have children, the average age of hav-
ing the fi rst child increased from 26.5 in 1995 to 
29.1 years old in 2005. Today, many women are 
having the fi rst child in their early 30s. Postponing 
the fi rst birth often translates into fewer subsequent 
births. At the same time, the population of unmar-
ried women in their 20s and 30s grew rapidly. The 
ratio of single women aged 25−29 reached 59.1% 
in 2005, up from 39.5% in 2000, while those aged 
30−34 increased to 19% from 10.4% during the 
same period. 
Another contributor to rapid demographic change 
is rising life expectancy. Koreans are living longer 
and healthier lives. The greater longevity represents 
the achievement of medical, social, and economic 
advances, but it also brings signifi cant challenges. 
Life expectancy of Koreans has increased dramati-
cally since 1960, and it will continue to rise as the 
result of better living conditions. The median age 
of Koreans was 19 in 1960, but it nearly doubled to 
35.1 years in 2005. The median age is projected to 
rise to 56.7 years in 2050. By then, the number of 
people (3.4 million) over 85 years old will nearly 
equal the number of children under 15 (3.8 mil-
lion). 
Declining Workforce: One of the challenges for 
an aging society is a declining total population. 
The nation’s population grew by an annual aver-
age of 1.1% during the period from 1949 to 1955. 
Growth accelerated to an annual average of 2.8% 
during the period from 1955 to 1966, then declined 
sharply to an annual average of 1.7% between 1966 
and 1985. According to the International Monetary 
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3Fund, Korea’s total population was 47.0 million in 
2000. This fi gure was 2.3 times higher than the pop-
ulation in 1949. The population will peak in 2018 
at 49.4 million, and then will to decline to 48.6 mil-
lion in 2030 and 42.3 million in 2050. The decline 
seems less dramatic in the near future because the 
number of elderly will still be rising. But the pace 
will accelerate after mid-century, and, if the low 
fertility rate continues, Korea is likely to lose more 
than half of its current population by 2100. 
Furthermore, the nation will suffer from the short-
age of economically active people, i.e., between 15 
and 64. After peaking at 36.2 million in 2016, the 
number will decline to 34.01 million in 2026 and 
24.42 million in 2050. By 2050, Korea will have 
one-third fewer working-age people than there are 
today. At the same time, the elderly population will 
continue to rise, outpacing the 15 & younger age 
group for the fi rst time in Korea’s history by 2019. 
In 2026, one out of fi ve Koreans will be aged 65 
or older. 
Challenges of Graying Nation: The rapidly gray-
ing of the nation will have a signifi cant impact 
on Korea’s future socio-economic environment. 
When the country has a high proportion of elderly 
population, a low proportion of working-age peo-
ple, and a declining total population, it is certain to 
experience rising fi scal burdens, capital shortages, 
and a lower growth potential. When the county 
grows old, the elderly people depend on younger 
people, not only for care and support, but also for 
the economic productivity that ensures that pen-
sion, health, and social costs are met. By 2030, it 
is projected that the average Korean worker would 
have to pay about 54.7% of his or her income in 
taxes, pension contributions, and other social wel-
fare related payments to support the elderly, up 
from 39.3% in 2005. In addition, the “support ra-
tio” will decline signifi cantly (Fig. 2). The support 
ratio measures the number of people of working 
age for each elderly person. In 1960, there were 
15.7 workers to support one elderly person, but the 
number gradually declined to 7.6 by 2008. The ra-
tio will continue to drop to 3.2 by 2026, and, by 
2050, there will be barely one Korean worker to 
support each retired person. 
Moreover, the nation’s economic growth potential 
will be threatened by the declining working age 
population and the rising aged population. Work-
ers aged 25−49 made up 58.8% of the population 
in 2000, but the proportion will decline to 40% by 
2030. The trend of declining working age popula-
tion relative to the retired population will continue 
in the future, making it diffi cult to achieve Korea’s 
goal of per capita income of $20,000. Furthermore, 
the average age of the working population will 
rise, implying that labor costs will increase due 
to decreased productivity. The International Mon-
etary Fund estimates that every 10% rise in the 
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4elderly population translates into a 0.41% drop in 
GDP. According to the Korea Development Insti-
tute, if the birth rate remains unchanged, Korea’s 
potential economic growth rate will decline from 
4.21% in 2006-2010 to 3.41 in 2011−2020, 2.64% 
in 2021−2030, 1.6% in 2031−2040, and 0.74% in 
2041−2050. 
Figure 2: Aged Support Ratio 
Source: Korean National Statistical Offi ce 
Supporting Tomorrow’s Elderly: Traditionally, 
Korean elders relied on their adult children for care 
and fi nancial support. Although a large number 
of them still live in extended families and receive 
care from their children, the number is waning 
rapidly. According to a report by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 81% 
of elders lived with their adult children in 1980, 
but the number decreased to 57% by 1995, 44% 
by 2004, and continues to fall. With the infl uence 
of the “modernization” and decreasing family size, 
the informal family network system is no longer 
the main family structure in Korea. The elderly 
know that it would be diffi cult for adult children to 
support their aged parents and their own children 
at the same time. The CSIS report cited the survey 
taken in 2006 of adults in their 50s: only 28% said 
they think their children will support them when 
they retire.   
With the breakdown of traditional informal support 
for the elderly, the government has made an effort 
to broaden the existing National Pension System 
(NPS) by setting the income replacement rate high 
for those with a low income level and low for those 
with high income level so that those with a high 
income level can help to secure incomes of those 
with low income. This plan is to provide all retirees 
guaranteed income upon retirement to maintain the 
standard of living regardless of their previous in-
come level. The government fi rst introduced NPS 
in 1988. At that time, the plan called for retirees to 
receive 70% of their average lifetime income by 
contribution of a mere 3% of their incomes. This 
plan was revised in 1998 to a 9% contribution and 
60% income replacement rate. The current retire-
ment eligible age is 60. But beginning the year 
2013, the eligibility age will increase by one year 
each fi ve years until 2033, when the retirement eli-
gibility age will be 65. 
As more people receive retirement benefi ts and 
as fewer young people are available to contribute, 
the NPS will become seriously under-funded and 
over-extended, according to economists and pen-
sion planners. The National Pension Development 
Committee (NPDC) reports that the total benefi ts 
paid by NPS in 2005 was 1.7% of workers’ tax-
able earnings, or 1/5 of the current 9% contribution 
rate. But the cost is expected to be more than the 
contribution rate by 2025 and will continue to rise 
thereafter to 30% by 2050 (Fig. 3).    
Figure 3: National Pension Expenditure 
(% of worker’s taxable payroll)
Source: NPDC
The graying of society is not only Korea’s problem. 
Many advanced countries have similar worries, but 
many have adopted policies to deal with the chal-
lenges. The Korean government has implemented 
several policies to cope with the anticipated aging 
population. However, policy responses have been 
slower for the demographic transition. If Korea is 
to continue on its growth path, the nation must rec-
ognize the seriousness of an aging society. Caring 
for the elderly is no longer a family problem but a 
national issue. 
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